

Article

The Impact of the Chinese Revolution on East Asia*

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Abstract

In terms of the number of people involved, the size of the country, and the protracted duration, the Chinese revolution was the greatest revolution in world history. As such, it of course had a major impact on all of East Asia. But that impact varied according to time and place. For purposes of analysis, the revolution can be divided chronologically into pre-Liberation and post-Liberation stages, and geographically we can distinguish the impact on China itself from the impact on other “colonial and semi-colonial areas” in East Asia. The spread of the revolution entered a third phase after the introduction of “reform and opening” policy in late 1978, at which point the PRC leadership began to disavow further efforts to “export revolution” and at least for the time being adopted a policy of building socialism in one country. Whether and in what form the impact of the revolutionary ideal will survive under these new circumstances remains as yet unclear.

□ Key words : Liberation, Cultural Revolution, Collateral Legitimation, Target Audience, Policy Dualism

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초록

관련된 사람의 숫자, 국가의 크기, 지속된 기간 등의 관점에서 보자면 중국 혁명은 세계 역사상 가장 거대한 혁명이었다. 그렇기 때문에 당연히 중국혁명은 모든 동아시아에 막대한 영향을 미쳤다. 그러나 그 영향은 시간과 장소에 따라서 다르다. 분석의 목적을 위해서 중국 혁명을, 연대기 순으로는 해방 전과 해방 후 단계로, 지리적으로는 중국 자체에 대한 영향과 동아시아의 다른 “식민지와 반식민지 지역”에 대한 영향으로 구분할 수 있다. 혁명의 전과는 1978년 말 “개혁과 개방” 정책을 도입한 후에 제3단계에 진입했고, 적어도 당분간은 일국 사회주의 건설 정책을 채택했다. 혁명적 이상의 영향이 이러한 새로운 환경 아래서도 지속될지, 그리고 어떤 형태로 지속될지는 여전히 불확실하다.

□ 주제어 : 해방, 문화혁명, 이차적 정당화, 소구 대상, 정책 이원주의

I . Introduction

The Chinese revolution was, in terms of the number of people involved (i.e., some 500 million people), the area covered (the third largest country in the world, ultimately drawing in Japan, Russia and the US as well), and the time span (from 1911 to 1978, if we include “continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat” and the Cultural Revolution) undoubtedly the greatest revolution in world history. Thus one would naturally expect considerable spillover affecting the rest of East Asia. And yet these transnational repercussions have not been systematically analyzed.¹⁾ That is no doubt partly because of the current division of labor among academic disciplines, and partly because the topic is so big and sprawling, involving events not only in China itself but in the countries affected over a very long time span. So this essay is a reluctant

1) An outstanding exception, on which I rely throughout this section, is Steven M. Goldstein’s article “The Chinese Revolution and the Colonial Areas: The View from Yenan, 1937-41,” *China Quarterly*, no. 75 (September 1978), pp. 594-622; drawn from the author’s unpublished PhD. Dissertation, “Chinese Communist Perspectives on International Affairs, 1937-1941,” Columbia University, 1972. See also John Gittings, *The World and China, 1922-1972* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).

pioneer, and a very modest one at that: much more research remains to be done.

Two important distinctions should be kept in mind to understand the regional impact of the Chinese revolution. First is the chronological distinction between the revolution before it succeeded and the revolution after “Liberation” in 1949. The revolution went through several stages, beginning with the founding of the Chinese Communist Party as a small band of young intellectuals in Shanghai in July 1921, the militarization of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after the split with the Nationalist Party in 1927, the period of war against Japan followed immediately by renewed civil war, and finally the attempt to sustain the revolutionary drive in the post-Liberation period (“continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat”) from 1949-1978. The most important chronological watershed was “Liberation” in 1949. The impact of the revolution on the rest of East Asia was quite different between the pre-Liberation period and after the new People’s Republic had been established. In the pre-Liberation period the impact was largely limited to fraternal communist parties engaged in national liberation movements against foreign imperialist occupations, permitting revolutionary appeals to be combined with nationalist appeals and incipient nation-building efforts. The second important distinction is between the revolutionary impact as viewed within China and that impact as viewed by the recipient or impacted countries.

While revolutionaries must be assumed to have exaggerated impressions of the impact of the revolution in view of the heroic sacrifices they endure for revolutionary ideals, there are reasons to consider CCP expectations somewhat more modest in the early period. First, the revolution itself at this time remained protean in form, constantly shifting to survive in changing threat environments, hardly approximating a well-defined “model” ready for export consumption. The revolution in 1927-1931 was a series of unsuccessful urban uprisings, for example, a model that was abandoned in the early 1930s in favor of mobilizing poor peasants and building “Soviets” in Jiangxi and other border areas, but this model too was then abandoned after the Long March in favor of more moderate land reform and a second united front policy, and so it went.

Second, the revolution before Liberation was of quite uncertain success, while after Liberation it was of course a *fait accompli*. Third, whereas before Liberation the Communist revolutionary movement was a ragtag band of outlaws struggling for survival, after liberation it gained control of the state apparatus, where it disposed of a foreign and defense ministry and a national publicity apparatus. While its previous circumstances gave it a certain “underdog” appeal, gaining national sovereignty not only amplified its voice but provided the resources to back up that voice with political resources and national policies. Finally, during the pre-Liberation period the CCP was more dependent on Soviet aid and support for survival than afterward. It was widely assumed not only in China but elsewhere that the Comintern was the world headquarters of revolution and that Moscow was pulling the strings for the entire international revolutionary movement. Thus the CCP’s relationship to other such parties was less hierarchical and more “fraternal” than later, when it increasingly assumed the role of patron or successful big brother.

The difference in perspective is even more significant. Despite frequent revolutionary complaints about “imperialist” victimization and its “semi-colonial” status, China never lost its national sovereignty throughout the 20th century. But nearly all the rest of Asia was absorbed into the imperial orbit of one or another Western power in the 19th century, followed by their conquest and even harsher occupation by allegedly anti-imperialist Japanese forces. That is, while China was a “semi-colony,” these were all “colonies.” This meant that although revolutionary forces shared with the CCP a strong anti-imperialist animus, the stronger hold of imperialism on these countries fostered a more widespread but also a more diverse and fragmented opposition to imperialism. Specifically, there was strong organized competition for nationalist legitimation in these countries, posing the question: would their Liberation be socialist, or “bourgeois nationalist”? True, the CCP also faced nationalist competition in the form of the Nationalist Party, or Guomindang (GMD); but was able more effectively to utilize the three-cornered fight between CCP, GMD and Japan to its own advantage. This was not always the case elsewhere. In any event, while the Communist revolution successfully claimed great prestige and a leadership role among revolutionary struggles

in East Asia even before it succeeded because of the size, centrality and historical importance of China, an advantage on which it then capitalized after Liberation as the first successful Communist state in the developing world, whether this model could be emulated elsewhere depended more on local conditions than on China's inspiring example.

The following paper consists of two parts, followed by a conclusion. In the first, the evolution of the CCP view of its role in the world revolution will be reviewed. In this section, the "target audience" of the revolution, even when suggested as a model for export, was the Chinese people themselves. In the second section, we consider the impact of the Chinese revolution in the rest of East Asia. Here the primary target audience was those "colonies and semi-colonies" which were now emerging from that status and seeking a path to rapid economic and political development.

II . The Chinese Revolution at Home

Basically, the CCP view of the significance of the Chinese revolution went through at least three stages. During the first stage, before the second United Front (from early 1920s to 1936), the impact of the Chinese revolution was conceived simply as a precedent. That is, China was the spark that would set a prairie fire because it was the first such revolution in a developing country and its success augured analogous success in other "colonial and semi-colonial" developing areas. At the second congress of the Communist International (Comintern) in July 1920, the Indian delegate M. N. Roy maintained that capitalists in industrially advanced countries were able to prolong their doomed existence only by exploiting semi-colonial areas such as China. The revolution should focus on these areas, thereby curtailing imperialist access to needed raw materials, and capitalism would quickly fall. Lenin agreed with the focus on the developing countries but disagreed with Roy's thesis that revolution in Asia be based solely on class conflict. Such regions had not yet developed a sufficiently large industrial sector for a large, class-conscious proletariat. Communists must thus provisionally support any plausible middle-class nationalist force in under-developed areas in the fight against foreign

imperialism. In the end, the Second Congress advised both revolution and cooperation with bourgeois nationalist parties, leaving the respective proportions to be defined according to local circumstances. Toward China between 1919 and 1927 Moscow thus recognized and sent an ambassador to the Republican Chinese government at Peking, who simultaneously served as an agent for the Comintern, which was actively encouraging Sun Yat-sen's Guomindang to overthrow that government. At the same time the Comintern helped organize the CCP, encouraging all its members to join the GMD in order eventually to capture it or replace it as vanguard of the revolution.

Thus the Chinese revolution during this early period was conceived by its agents to have two defining features. The first was categorial: China was the first would-be national liberation revolution to take place in Third World developing "colonies and semi-colonies," thereby demonstrating that revolution should logically be possible in all other members of that category. The second was in terms of content: China represented a kind of policy dualism, combining revolutionary class struggle (i.e. violence) with temporary United Front cooperation with a bourgeois nationalist party. This was done with the full endorsement of the Comintern and in accord with the thesis that revolutions in the colonial world would go through two stages in unbroken sequence, the bourgeois-democratic and socialist. The Chinese struggle became the outstanding example of such a strategy. The Comintern "advised the other Communist parties in the colonial world to study the experience of the Chinese Communist Party."²⁾ Naturally, during the 1927-1936 period, the violent break with the GMD initiated by Chiang Kai-shek in Shanghai in 1927 seriously undermined the credibility of the United Front doctrine and almost annihilated the CCP leadership. Moscow then endorsed a policy of urban insurrection, and a series of such attacks were duly carried out under the leadership of Li Lisan, all of them unsuccessful.

Upon reconciliation with the GMD at Xian in 1936, policy dualism was resumed, though in view of the sorry history of the relationship it

2) Kermit E. McKenzie, *Comintern and World Revolution, 1928-1943: The Shaping of Doctrine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 137; as cited in Goldstein, p. 598, fn. 12.

was far more fragile and suspicious. The seventh congress of the Comintern decided in the summer of 1935 to organize a world-wide anti-fascist united front, fitting into Moscow's concern with the antic-communist animus shared by Germany and Japan, as formalized the following year in the anti-Comintern pact. But it was during this period that the CCP leadership, since the Zunyi Conference in December 1935 under the de facto leadership of Mao Zedong and now relatively isolated from Comintern counsel deep in the wilderness of the Shaanxi-Shanxi-Gansu (Yanan) base area, began to take the Chinese revolution in a different direction. Having preferred a hard line (public trial and execution) against Chiang at Xian, Mao favored a very loose definition of bipartisan cooperation under the new united front which would allow the CCP maximal freedom of maneuver. Thus the true profile of the CCP revolutionary strategy gradually became clear: focus on "People's war," mobilizing peasant armies aimed at eventual victory over the GMD, under cover of a nominal united front with the GMD. This was a perceptible departure from Comintern guidelines, which the CCP did not deny but made bold to advertise their originality as a model for other revolutions. In an interview with Edgar Snow in July 1936, Mao discussed the Chinese revolution as follows: "The Chinese revolution is a key factor in the world situation and its victory is heartily anticipated by the people of every country, especially by the toiling masses of the colonial countries. When the Chinese revolution comes into full power, the masses of many colonial countries will follow the example of China and win a similar victory of their own."³) While Moscow continued to define the revolution in terms of the anti-fascist united front, the Chinese focus was on a revolutionary rising tide. In the summer of 1939 relations with the GMD worsened and the CCP began to harp on the necessity of armed struggle and the untrustworthiness of the bourgeoisie. Meanwhile CCP strategy became one of increasingly open competition with the GMD for space and power. It expanded its base areas and sought to consolidate its influence in those areas, while conducting a propaganda campaign to sway public opinion.

3) Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York: Grove Press, 1968, first revised & enlarged edition), p. 181.

All such departures from the Comintern mainstream were justified in terms of adaptation to local conditions, which the Comintern had also endorsed. Because of these innovations, the CCP claimed to hold a “unique position” among national revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial areas. Mao Zedong had created a revolutionary “theory” applicable not only to the special characteristics of China, but to other areas as well. The crowning public assertion of the CCP’s unique leadership role was made by Liu Shaoqi in his Report to the Party’s 7th Party Congress in 1945, in which he referred to Mao Zedong or his thought no less than 105 times: “the Thought of Mao Zedong··will··make great and useful contributions to the cause of the emancipation of the peoples of all countries, and of the peoples of the East in particular.” In the revised Party Constitution (which Liu also drafted), Mao’s Thought was put on the same footing with Marxism as a “guiding principle for all the works of the Party.”⁴⁾ In a later interview with Anna Louise Strong, Liu elaborated: “Mao has not only applied Marxism to new conditions but has given it a new development. He has created a Chinese or Asiatic form of Marxism.”⁵⁾

The third phase in the evolution of the CCP’s conception of the significance of the Chinese revolution to the rest of East Asia (and the world) came in the post-Liberation era. Now fully utilizing the resources of a national propaganda apparatus, the Chinese revolution was subtly transformed into a purer, more abstract conception rationalizing China’s mission to Asia and the world. While in the pre-Liberation phases the revolution tended to disappear into a series of bilateral wars and civil wars, now it became a triangular “united front” ideal type consisting of the revolutionary masses, the imperialist class enemy, and the provisory, unreliable (nationalist) ally. In 1947 Mao first referred to an “intermediate zone” between the emerging bipolar “two camps” of socialism and capital-

4) “On the Party,” (May 1945), *Collected Works of Liu Shaoqi* (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1969), vol. II, pp. 9-119; as cited in Lowell Dittmer, *Liu Shaoqi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998, rev. ed.), p. 22.

5) Anna Louise Strong, “The Thought of Mao Tse-tung,” *Amerasia* 11, no. 6 (June 1947), pp. 161-174.

ism, where he predicted the Chinese revolutionary model would have special relevance. For the next ten years or so this model envisaged China in a “lips to teeth” embrace with the Soviet Union and the rest of the communist bloc while also being tactically aligned with the not yet socialist but promising developing world in a united front against the imperialist class enemy led by the US. In this model, initially with Moscow’s blessing, China saw its revolutionary mission to be cultivating ties to the new nations of Asia and Africa, severing their colonial ties to imperialism and luring them first into nationalist nonalignment and ultimately into the socialist camp. The governments in these new countries were above all nationalist, not socialist, but not unsympathetic to socialism. Pushing “revolution” on a new nation where the government’s authority was not yet fully consolidated was hence a delicate task.⁶⁾ And China’s approach was equivocal, vacillating between the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” (inscribed in the Party statute at the 8th Congress in 1956 and in every subsequent Party statute) with its emphasis on national sovereignty and noninterference on the one hand and an insistence on the necessity for violent revolution (and support for revolutionary movements) on the other. China’s apparent gains in its more radical approach to the Third World in places like Vietnam, Algeria or Cuba were sufficiently disconcerting to the USSR, which had meanwhile made little progress promoting the parliamentary road to revolution in developed countries boasting an organized industrial proletariat such as France or Italy, that Moscow abandoned its division of revolutionary labor with China and also became engaged in the promotion of revolution in the Third World. This competition in revolutionary promotion contributed to the Sino-Soviet rift beginning in the early 1960s. As the relationship with the Soviet Union fell apart China split the communist bloc into an opposing majority and a radical minority and began to insist more stridently on the violent revolutionary option in the developing world while condemning Moscow’s embrace of “peaceful coexistence.”

This culminated in the Cultural Revolution foreign policy of un-

6) See Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese foreign policy; Peking's support for wars of national liberation* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970.

compromising global class struggle. This model or vision was most fully articulated by Lin Biao in his 20,000-word pamphlet *Long Live the Victory of the People's War!* released in 1965, which likened the “emerging forces” of the poor in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to the “rural areas of the world”, while the affluent countries of the West were likened to the “cities of the world”. Eventually the “cities” would be encircled by revolutions in the “rural areas”, following the model of the Chinese revolutionary civil war.⁷⁾ Lin made no promise that China would fight other people's wars, and foreign revolutionaries were advised to depend mainly on “self-reliance”. The new revolutionary framework was that of “three worlds,” casting both the US and the USSR as the hegemonic superpowers, a second world of sympathetic but unreliable middle powers like France or Japan, and a revolutionary international proletariat of developing (if not necessarily Communist) Third World countries led by China, as articulated by Deng Xiaoping in a speech to the United Nations in 1974.⁸⁾ This provocative stance in opposition to both superpowers at once was however sustainable neither internationally nor domestically, as was tacitly acknowledged in China's 1972 invitation to Richard Nixon to visit the PRC. The obvious ideological incompatibility of the Three Worlds model with the emerging rapprochement with the US was quietly ignored, justifying the latter in purely strategic terms. Finally, with the rise of Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues at the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in 1978 and the advent of his “reform and opening” policy, the revolutionary model was systematically dismantled piecemeal: an apocalyptic global class war between communism and capitalism was no longer deemed inevitable, the Soviet Union was no longer a social imperialist power, and China would no longer engage in the export of revolution but henceforth conduct cordial businesslike relations with all of its major trade partners in pursuit of “peace and development.”

7) Lin Biao, *Long live the victory of people's war! In commemoration of the 20th anniversary of victory in the Chinese people's war of resistance against Japan*, (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1965)..

8) Deng Xiaoping, “Firmly Support the Just Demands of the Third World” [Jian jue zhi chi di san shi jie di zheng yi yao qiu], address to the UN General Assembly, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong san lian shu dian, 1974).

III . The Perspective of the East Asian Audience

Whereas the domestic impact of the Chinese revolution was essentially to enhance the status of the CCP within China and the reputation of Mao Zedong within the CCP, its impact on other Asian countries was quite different. Each of these countries had different perspectives of the Chinese revolution based on the internal political and economic situations in their own countries. In the pre-Liberation period, all of these countries with the exception of Japan were still colonies of various Western states, and during World War II most of them were emancipated and then essentially recolonized as part of Japan's so-called Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. The Japanese occupation dislodged the imperialist forces (with the partial exception of French Indochina, where Japan cooperated with the Vichy French regime) and awakened a desire for independence within these countries, which seemed well within reach upon the defeat of Japan and withdrawal of Japanese occupation forces. While the US as a former colony was naturally sympathetic to this desire, the rise of the Cold War in the late 1940s occluded that sympathy. The Chinese revolution, viewed at the time as a dramatic victory for the Communist bloc and a major setback to American material and ideal interests, brought to power a government far more sympathetic to a complete end to Western imperialism, viewing this however as but the first stage of a process ultimately leading to Communist revolution. While some of the more diplomatically sophisticated thinkers in the American foreign policy establishment considered a tactical alignment with China as a way of splitting the communist bloc, the domestic disposition of public opinion in the US was conservative and anti-communist. The upshot was a domestic blame game about the "loss" of China and a long confrontation between the US and China in the East Asian region.

Thus the two main factors determining the stance of the other East Asian countries toward the Chinese revolution were first, the domestic balance of forces between revolutionary or proto-revolutionary forces and more conservative constituencies; and second, the position of these emerging nations vis-à-vis the two superpowers; namely, the US, which had

emerged from World War II in a position of unparalleled strength, and the USSR, which had been devastated by the Nazi invasion but nevertheless survived the war with major gains in the division of spoils from the defeat of fascism (to which it had contributed greatly) to mount a challenge American hegemony. Based on these two criteria, East Asian countries can for analytical purposes be divided into three categories: (1) those whose alignment with the US and domestic alignment of forces precluded sympathy with the Chinese revolution, which they viewed as a threat, thereby becoming integrated into the Cold War anti-communist bloc; (2) those in which the domestic balance of forces and international allegiances were mixed and uncertain; and (3) those in which the domestic balance of forces and/or alignment with the Soviet Union fostered a disposition of greater sympathy for the Chinese revolution and interest in sustained relations with the communist bloc.

Japan may be taken as the clearest and most important exemplar of the first category, which also includes South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. The domestic balance of forces in postwar Japan was essentially neo-feudal. Although both communist and socialist parties had emerged before the war and revived in the American-superimposed democracy, organized labor had been brutally repressed by the previous military dictatorship and labor was organized into relatively tame company unions in the post-war economy. The left remained a vociferous but hopeless tiny minority in the Japanese Diet. The essential fact about post-war Japanese politics was that it had been defeated and militarily occupied by the US, with which it then formed a long-term bilateral security alliance including provision for quasi-permanent American forward bases, all of which understandably limited its foreign policy options. While Japan's foreign policy under the post-war Yoshida doctrine remained friendly to all potential trade partners, it did not recognize the PRC until after the Nixon visit. Japan was also a passive (in deference to Article 9, prohibiting war) but vitally important forward base for US military forces in the Korean and Vietnamese wars. Japan's attitude toward the Chinese revolution has thus remained relatively critical, if somewhat guilt-ridden over the Japanese invasion of China (though Mao, then eager for Sino-Japanese normalization, not only exonerated the invasion but expressed apprecia-

tion for its contribution to CCP victory).⁹⁾ The major impact of the Chinese revolution on Japan began early in the post-war period but had lasting impact: the overall power rebalance and the American over-reaction to the onset of the Cold War represented by the Chinese revolution precipitated an abrupt reversal of the process of democratization and historic reconciliation then underway under the auspices of the US occupation forces and facilitated a “reverse course,” in which Japanese thinking about Japan’s sense of responsibility for the war was tacitly excused in the light of Japan’s involvement in the Cold War (and Japan’s victimhood in the world’s first nuclear attack).

The second category is a more mixed situation, given the balance of domestic and international forces. The Philippines can be taken as representative of such cases, which also include Burma, Malaysia, and Cambodia. The domestic class structure in these cases provided plausible ground for a positive evaluation of the Chinese revolutionary experience. But in most cases the revolutionary constituency was ethnically or economically circumscribed, making it difficult for them to mobilize the nationalist appeals so effectively employed by the CCP in China. Thus in Malaysia, Burma, and Indonesia, the appeal of the Chinese model tended to be limited to the overseas Chinese ethnic minority, while in southern Thailand and the Philippines it tended to be limited to the Muslim minority. Meanwhile in all these cases the international alignment of forces was far less favorable to revolutionary emulation, falling as they did on the wrong side of the “bamboo curtain” in the Asian Cold War.

The Philippines became the only East Asian colony of the US as spoil of the Spanish-American War in 1898. Philippine rebels had been engaged in a war of independence against Spain immediately prior to the war, which the US encouraged as part of their war against Spain, but soon after annexation in the peace settlement they reconsidered their support for in-

9) “Without your Imperial Army’s invasion the Chinese people would never have been able to unite in resistance and the CCP would never have been able to seize power,” he told a visiting delegation from the Japanese Socialist Party in 1964. Mao Zedong, “Jiejian Riben shehuidang renshi de tanhui” [Discussions with members of Japan’s Socialist Party], in *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* [Long live Maozedong Thought] (Beijing: n.p., 1969), p. 533.

dependence and became engulfed in a 15-year insurgency far more costly than the Spanish-American War in which the colony had been acquired. After finally suppressing the rebels the Americans established a tutelary government with an advisory legislature (one house elected, one appointed) and an appointed governor-general, all of which were designed to prepare the archipelago for eventual democratic independence. A new constitution was adopted in 1935 that allowed popular election of both parliament and the executive and set a date for full sovereignty, which was duly granted on schedule in 1946 after a bloody fight to defeat the Japanese occupation regime. The Americans established a new educational system (English language) and health care system. But neither the American occupation nor the succeeding Republic of the Philippines ever did conduct land reform and there was great economic inequality and corruption that forestalled Philippine participation in the economic miracle of its Asian neighbors. The Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP-1930) was established secretly in 1930, hoping to resume what they regarded as the unfinished armed revolution against foreign and feudal domination, referring to the legacy and de facto continuation of the Philippine-American War of 1899 and the fight against modern revisionism then being promoted by the Soviet Union. Inspired by the corruption of the Marcos regime domestically and by the Chinese Cultural Revolution abroad, the party was refounded as the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in 1968. In On March 29, 1969, the New People's Army was established and on April 24, 1973 the National Democratic Front (Philippines). The CPP then launched a "protracted people's war" in obvious emulation of CCP civil war strategy, aiming eventually to install a "people's revolutionary government" via a two-stage revolution: National Democratic Revolution followed by a Socialist Revolution. The CPP adhered (and still adheres) to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as its guiding ideology, considers Maoism the highest development of Marxism-Leninism, and participates in the Maoist International Conference of Marxist-Leninist Parties and Organizations, an organization long since abandoned by the CCP. After forty-three years of waging war against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and some 40,000 casualties, the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army is now at its lowest ebb, with an estimated

5,000 cadres (down from a peak of 28,000 in the 1980s). Designated a terrorist organization by the US and the EU in 2002 and still deemed a significant threat by the Philippine government, the CPP-NPA is plagued by factional splits and declining morale and no longer enjoys PRC support.

The two cases in which the Chinese revolution was most likely to find a favorable reception are North Korea and Vietnam. The case of North Korea would seem to be almost ideal in this respect for a number of reasons: Korea's geographic proximity to China and his historical background as a tributary state, which had been invaded twice and subject to prolonged occupation by Japan (predisposing its population to be anti-Japan and pro-China). Moreover, the personal socialization of the future North Korean leader was closely connected to China. Kim Il Sung was born Kim Song-ju in Mangyungbong, Korea in 1912, raised in a Presbyterian family; he claims that his maternal grandfather was a Protestant minister, that his father had gone to a missionary school and was an elder in the Presbyterian Church, and that his parents were very active in the religious community. According to the official version, Kim's family participated in early anti-Japanese activities during the occupation, and in 1920 they migrated to Manchuria, where Kim attended a Chinese school for eight years and learned to speak fluent Chinese (according to at least one report, better than his Korean). Although subsequent stories of his revolutionary youth are hard to distinguish from North Korean hagiography, Kim apparently engaged in anti-Japanese activities as a young man and joined the Chinese Communist party in 1931, the same year Japan occupied Manchuria. When Japan invaded and then annexed Manchuria, a strong guerrilla resistance emerged embracing both Koreans and Chinese. There were well over 200,000 guerrillas—all loosely connected and including bandits and secret societies—fighting the Japanese in the early 1930s; after a brutal but effective Japanese counterinsurgency campaign, the number declined to a few thousand by the mid-1930s. It was from this milieu that Kim Il Sung emerged. In 1935, Kim became a member of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, a guerrilla group led by the CCP. Kim was appointed the same year to serve as political commissar for the 3rd detachment of the second division, around 160 soldiers. His immediate superior officer, Wei Zhengmin, reported directly to

Kang Sheng, until Wei's death on 8 March 1941. Kim was appointed commander of the 6th division in 1937, at the age of 24, controlling a few hundred men in a group that came to be known as "Kim Il-sung's division." It was while he was in command of this division that he executed a raid on Poch'onbo, on 4 June. The Japanese considered Kim to be one of the most effective and dangerous Korean guerrilla leaders, and formed a special Japanese-Korean counterinsurgency unit to track him down. In 1938 Kim was appointed commander of the 2nd operational region for the 1st Army, but by the end of 1940, he was the only 1st Army leader still alive. Pursued by Japanese troops, Kim and what remained of his army escaped by crossing the Amur River into the Soviet Union. Kim was sent to a camp near Khabarovsk, where the Korean Communist guerrillas were retrained by the Soviets. Kim then became a Major in the Soviet Red Army and served in it until the end of World War II. The Soviet Red Army declared war on Japan in August 1945 in accord with the Yalta and Teheran conference agreements, immediately following the American atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Thus the Red Army entered Pyongyang against little resistance on August 15. At this point Stalin realized he needed someone to head a new government so he asked Lavrenty Beria to recommend possible candidates. Beria met Kim several times before recommending him to Stalin. Kim arrived in Korea on 22 August after 8 years in exile. Soviet leaders presented him to the Korean people as a resistance hero. In September the Soviets installed Kim as head of the Provisional People's Committee. Kim's Korean was so marginal he needed considerable coaching to read a speech the MVD had prepared for him at a Communist Party congress three days after he arrived. He was not, at this time, the head of the Communist Party, whose headquarters were still in Seoul in the US-occupied south.

Like Mao, Kim Il Sung's power derived from the "gun." He had both military experience in Chinese guerrilla forces and Soviet professional military training, and he promptly established a professional Korean army upon seizing power. The Korean People's Army (KPA) was aligned with the CCP (with Soviet advisors and equipment) and formed from a cadre of guerrillas and former soldiers who had gained combat experience in battles against the Japanese and later against Nationalist Chinese troops.

Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 Joseph Stalin equipped the KPA with modern heavy tanks, trucks, artillery, and small arms. Kim also formed an air force, equipped at first with ex-Soviet propeller-driven fighter and attack aircraft. Later, North Korean pilot candidates were sent to the Soviet Union and China to train in MiG-15 jet aircraft at secret bases. Although original plans called for all-Korean elections sponsored by the United Nations, in May 1948 the South declared statehood as the Republic of Korea, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was proclaimed on 9 September, with Kim as premier. On 12 October, the Soviet Union recognized Kim's government as the only lawful government on the peninsula. The Communist Party merged with the New People's Party to form the Workers Party of North Korea (of which Kim was vice-chairman). In 1949, the Workers Party of North Korea merged with its southern counterpart to become the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) with Kim as party chair. By 1949, the communists had consolidated their authority in North Korea. All parties and mass organizations were members of the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland, a popular front in which the Workers Party predominated. Around this time, the first statues of Kim appeared, and he began calling himself "Great Leader" [*widaechan suryeong*]. Like Chiang Kai-shek in 1926, Kim consolidated his leadership in a prompt decision to go to war, i.e., to unify the country by invading the south, which he did on June 25, 1950, with the reluctant concurrence of Moscow and Beijing. The invasion was facilitated by tanks, artillery and aircraft provided by the USSR. China did not intervene or assist until UN troops under General Douglas MacArthur reached the banks of the Yalu after their bold flank attack at Incheon, forcing Kim and his government to flee north, first to Sinuiju and eventually into China. Although intervention by Chinese People's Volunteers clearly saved the DPRK from defeat and exile, the relation between Kim and the Chinese government was not entirely harmonious. Chinese and Russian documents from that time reveal that while Kim became increasingly desperate to establish a truce, since the likelihood that further fighting would successfully unify Korea under his rule became derisory after UN /US intervention. Kim also resented the Chinese taking over the majority of the fighting in his country, with

Chinese forces stationed at the center of the front line and the KPA being mostly restricted to the coastal flanks of the front. Finally, Chinese troops remained in the North well after the truce, until 1958. Fearing excessive Chinese influence, Kim sought throughout the Cold War to balance between China and the Soviet Union. Most of his aid came from the USSR and the Eastern European People's Republics, while most of his trade (with the exception of energy) was with PRC. During the Sino-Soviet dispute in the 1960s, Kim sided with the PRC, criticizing Khrushchev's reform schemes as "revisionist." At the same time the North Korean approach to economic modernization seems to have adhered faithfully to the Stalinist model, with its strong emphasis on hierarchical planning and heavy industry, avoiding Mao's populist innovations. The DPRK has never been comfortable unleashing the "masses." Thus Kim took exception to such Maoist experiments as the Hundred Flowers or Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This infuriated Mao, who denounced Kim's leadership and initiated rapprochement with the US. Kim was however also unhappy with Gorbachev's experiments with Perestroika and Glasnost. This aversion was exacerbated by Soviet recognition of the Republic of Korea in 1990, and even more by Yeltsin's repudiation of the Leninist system the following year.

Although thus counterbalanced by strong Soviet influence, the impact of the Chinese revolution on North Korea has been considerable. The cult of Kim il Sung and the Kim family (there are some 500 statues of Kim Il Sung in North Korea) clearly owes much to the Chinese (and Stalinist) cult of personality. Even the symbolism—Kim's adopted name Il Song means "become the sun" and Kim was lauded as "sun of the nation"—evoke the Mao cult. The concept of *juče* seems conceptually derivative of the Chinese notion of *zeli gengsheng*, or self-reliance, though it has come to mean more than this. *Juče* has become the core concept of Kim Il Sung-ism and was applied even more thoroughly there than in Maoist China, resulting in the DPRK's return to the "hermit kingdom" complex pioneered by the Joseon dynasty. Another key concept, Chollima (flying horse), implying a general acceleration of economic modernization efforts, bears some kinship with the Chinese Great Leap Forward with which it approximately coincided, originating in the Five-Year Plan of 1956–1961

(also known as the Chollima Movement). As in the CCP, Kim pursued a style of mass leadership that involved getting close to the people, visiting factory or farm to give “on the spot guidance.” The KWP departed from Soviet orthodoxy by including masses of peasants in the party, which the North Koreans term a “mass” rather than a “vanguard” party. Most KWP members at this time were poor peasants with no previous political experience. On the other hand, there are also significant differences, and these seem to have increased over time. There has never been an anti-intellectual bias in the North as there was in China (the flag interposes a writer’s brush between hammer and sickle), perhaps because so many intellectuals fled south during the war and were needed. North Korean military strategy, with its heavy reliance on tanks and artillery in a Blitzkrieg-style offensive, derives more from Kim’s Soviet training than from Maoist “People’s War.” And Kim’s long obsession with acquiring nuclear weaponry contrasts with Mao’s dismissal of the bomb as a “paper tiger,”--not to mention the Kims’ wily, protracted evasion of China’s efforts (in collaboration with Russia and the West) to induce him to renounce nuclear armament and adhere to the DPRK’s signed commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. One of the great ironies of the relationship is that since the early 1990s, even as the collapse of the USSR and the great Korean famine made the DPRK more economically dependent on China than ever before, the North Korean model has not converged with that of the PRC, nor has it accommodated its only ally’s diplomatic priorities. In fact both domestic and foreign policies have diverged. Kim initially denounced the Chinese reforms as “revisionist.” And despite strong Chinese encouragement and pointed invitations to visit Shenzhen, Shanghai and other reform showcases, Kim Chung Il has stubbornly resisted application of the Chinese “reform and opening” model to the North Korean economy. Further elaboration of the KWP’s ideological doctrines under Kim Chung Il seems to have been independently conceived; e.g., the concept of *songun* or “military first” owes nothing to the Chinese revolutionary experience.

Ho Chi Minh also had numerous cultural and associational ties to the Chinese revolution in the course of his revolutionary career. Ho Chi Minh was born in 1890 in the peasant village of Hoang Tru. His father was

a Confucian scholar and teacher, later an imperial magistrate in a small rural district. His childhood studies (with his father before more formal classes) included mastery of Chinese calligraphy, a requisite for any serious study of Confucianism. At the request of his father, Ho received a French education, attended lycée in Huế, the alma mater of his later disciples, Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap. Failing to gain a spot in the colonial civil service, he left school to go abroad. Earning his way as kitchen helper on a French steamer, he arrived in Marseille in December 2011. After unsuccessfully applying for the French Colonial Administrative School, he decided to commence world travel by working on ships from 1911 to 1917, including the US, Italy, Britain and France, earning his way by menial labor. In France, he joined the Socialist Party of France, on behalf of which he petitioned for recognition of the civil rights of the Vietnamese people in French Indochina at the Versailles peace talks, but was ignored. In 1920, as a representative in the Congress of Tours of Socialist Party of France, Minh voted for the Third International and became a founding member of the Parti Communiste Français (FCP). In this period he learned to write journal articles and short stories as well as running his Vietnamese nationalist group. In 1923, Ho left Paris for Moscow, where he was employed by the Comintern, studied at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East and participated in the Fifth Comintern Congress in June 1924. He seems to have first visited China in 1924-1926, when he organized “Youth Education Classes” in Guangzhou and occasionally gave socialist lectures to Vietnamese young people living in Canton at the Whampoa Military Academy. These young people would become the seeds of a new revolutionary, pro-communist movement in Vietnam several years later. In early 1930 in Hong Kong, Ho chaired a meeting with representatives from two Vietnamese communist parties to merge them into a unified Communist Party of Vietnam. After arrest, flight, and more travel, he was allowed to return to China, where he served as an advisor to the CCP Red Army. Ho then returned to Vietnam to lead the Viet Minh independence movement against combined Japanese and Vichy French (collaborationist) occupation forces. He oversaw many successful military actions against the occupation of Vietnam during World War II, supported closely but clandestinely by the

United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS). At the end of the war American President Roosevelt initially did not wish the French to regain control of their colony and asked Chiang Kai-shek to assume control. Chiang first refused, then agreed to deploy forces to maintain order pending independence. In September 1945, a force of 200,000 Republic of China Army troops thus arrived in Hanoi. Ho made a compromise with their general, Lu Han, to dissolve the Communist Party and make a deal in which Vietnam would be recognized as an autonomous state in the Indochinese Federation and the French Union. The purpose of the agreement, for both the French and Ho's Vietminh, was to hasten the withdrawal of Chiang's forces from Vietnam. As Ho put it in 1946:

The last time the Chinese came, they stayed a thousand years. The French are foreigners. They are weak. Colonialism is dying. The white man is finished in Asia. But if the Chinese stay now, they will never go. As for me, I prefer to sniff French shit for five years than to eat Chinese shit for the rest of my life.¹⁰⁾

Ho collaborated with the French colonial forces to speed the departure of KMT forces (and wipe out domestic nationalist rivals), but no sooner had this been done than the agreement broke down. The bombardment of Haiphong by French forces at Hanoi only confirmed Ho's suspicion that France had no intention of allowing an independent state in Vietnam. On 19 December 1946, Ho declared war against the French Union, marking the beginning of the first Indochina War. In February 1950 Ho met with Stalin and Mao Zedong in Moscow after the Soviet Union recognized his government. They all agreed that China would be responsible for backing the Viet Minh. Mao's emissary to Moscow stated in August that China planned to train 60-70,000 Viet Minh in the near future. In 1954, after the crushing defeat of French Union forces in the battle of Dien Bien Phu, in which Chinese advisors and military aid including heavy artillery played an important role (as the US for their part provided major assistance to the French), France was forced to give up its fight

10) Quoted in Andrew Forbes, "Why Vietnam loves and hates China", *Asia Times Online*, (26 April 2007)

against the Viet Minh at the 1954 Geneva peace conference. The second Indochina War commenced in the early 1960s beginning with guerrilla warfare by indigenous Viet Cong forces and culminating in large-scale infantry and artillery engagements in the 1970s.

The impact of the Chinese revolutionary experience on Vietnam was profound. According to Chinese sources, the PRC sent 320,000 personnel into Vietnam in total, mostly Anti-aircraft artillery and military engineers. Between 1965 and 1969, 23 columns, 95 brigades and 83 battalions of PLA soldiers were in Vietnam, engaged in various combat activities, including 2,153 AAA engagements with the Americans, downing 1,707 U.S. combat aircraft and damaging 1,608. Between 1965 and 1972, A total of 1,100 PLA soldiers were killed and buried in Vietnam, with 4,200 wounded. China's material aid to Vietnam, mostly no-strings-attached, was worth US\$20 billion, including 270,000 assault rifles, 700 tons of explosives, 200,000 sets of uniforms for the Vietcong in the South between 1962 and 1966. Chinese official documents also claim that "almost the entire supply of equipment and ammunition of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, except a very small amount captured from the enemy, came from China, free of charge." There were also up to 70,000 PLA troops (with up to 21,000 in AA batteries and in defense of PLA engineering forces) in Laos, mostly from 1969 to 1973, with the final Chinese troops out by 1978.¹¹⁾ The historical relationship had also been close, but as Ho remembered, China had occupied the country for nearly a thousand years and Vietnamese independence had been hard won and remained jealously guarded. In terms of revolutionary military strategy there was some emulation of the tactics of Maoist "people's war," particularly during the early Viet Cong phase of the 2nd Vietnam War in the south. But General Vo Nguyen Giap, DRV Defense Minister and military commander of communist forces in both first and second Vietnam wars, did not adhere faithfully to Chinese strategic advice, preferring what he called "modern people's war." With the help of Soviet military supplies and equipment he built the People's Army of Vietnam into a large con-

11) See Xiaoming Zhang, "China's Involvement in Laos during the Vietnam War, 1963-1975," *Journal of Military History*, October 2002.

ventional army, conducted the decisive battle of Dienbienphu as a classic siege, and consistently preferred large unit attacks to guerrilla warfare.¹²⁾ He could do so thanks to Soviet supply of weaponry and equipment, which became more bounteous than Chinese military aid after 1972, as well as Soviet strategic advice. For like Pyongyang, Hanoi relied on both Soviet and Chinese support, initially perceiving no conflict in so doing and later attempting to balance between them. When the dispute became so intense that Hanoi had to choose they chose to lean to the Soviet side, to the immense displeasure of Beijing. Upon achieving victory in the south and reunifying the nation Sino-Vietnamese relations rapidly deteriorated, exacerbated by the forced out-migration of ethnic Chinese “boat people” in connection with socialization of the means of production after takeover in the south, compounded by territorial disputes over land borders as well as over the Parcel and the Spratley island groupings. All this culminated in the brief but sanguinary Sino-Vietnamese war in the spring of 1979, leaving a bitter legacy. Yet Vietnam, after its economy nearly collapsed shortly after “socialist transition” in the early 1980s, adopted the Chinese economic reform strategy known domestically as Doi Moi in 1986, with generally successful results.

As these two cases illustrate, the Chinese revolution had considerable influence throughout Asia well before it succeeded. While China was in constant revolutionary turmoil throughout the first half of the 20th century, it was centrally located in Asia and by the late 1930s has achieved revolutionary momentum. And the fact that it was not yet by any means successful gave it a certain romantic appeal. But although the CCP certainly was interested in advertising its narrative and mission and took every available opportunity to do so, this was not high on its list of priorities. At the top of this list was survival, and if fellow revolutionaries from abroad could fit into that scenario they were welcome. These visiting revolutionaries were for their part even more obsessed with survival, as in most cases their revolutions were not nearly as far advanced as the Chinese revolution. They were not necessarily looking for a model of the

12) See Pierre Asselin, “New Perspectives on Dien Bien Phu,” *Explorations in Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol 1, No. 2 (Fall 1997), <http://www.hawaii.edu/cseas/pubs/explore/v1n2-art2.html>

revolutionary future, this they had already discovered in Marx and Lenin, what they most desperately needed was more practical assistance--temporary refuge, weapons, funding. And China was during this period a secondary source of this help. The first was Moscow, home of the first and thus far only successful communist revolution, headquarters of the Communist International and of the Toilers of the East University where young revolutionaries received training. After Liberation, Chinese attempts to popularize the Chinese revolutionary model were intensified in a far more intensive national program of military aid and endorsement of revolutionary “national liberation” movements throughout Asia and the rest of the Third World.¹³⁾

IV. Conclusions

The Chinese revolution had a considerable impact on the world, both in China and in neighboring lands in East Asia. It reinforced the Leninist apparatus as the standard organizational paradigm for such movements, along with the major innovation of expanding the Marxist definition of the proletariat (heretofore limited to the urban working class and radical intelligentsia) to include the peasantry and even congenial parts of the middle class in a “united front.” Prior to Liberation in 1949, although the CCP’s resources were quite limited, it harbored fellow revolutionaries and sympathetic leftists from around the world in an attempt to foster favorable public opinion and if possible encourage analogous revolutionary movements. After Liberation, the CCP began to focus its foreign policy and economic resources on exporting the revolutionary experience.

13) E.g., the highest proportion of GNP the developed countries gave as foreign aid barely exceeded 0.5 percent, and the US figure at the turn of the millennium was far below 0.01 percent. Under Mao, China’s foreign aid reached 6.92 percent (in 1973), the highest amount (as a proportion of GNP) the world has ever known. China Today, ed., *Dangdai Zhongguo de duiwai jingji bezuo* [China Today: Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries], (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe), 1989, p. 68. For an excellent analysis see Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese foreign policy: Peking’s support for wars of national liberation* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970).

The success in fostering admiration and emulation of the Chinese revolutionary experience abroad was however limited both by the subsequent policies of the PRC government and by the situation in the recipient countries. The failure of the Great Leap Forward, though its full dimensions were not known until later, naturally had a depressing effect on such promotional efforts. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, on the other hand, had an initial positive impact on revolutionary publicity. But it also contributed to the split of international revolutionary efforts into radical and moderate/factions, to the detriment of both. The domestic situation in intended recipients of the revolutionary impetus varied from case to case, from the Philippines or Malaysia, where it resulted in sustained but ultimately futile insurgency, to Indonesia, where it contributed to the growth of the largest communist party outside the bloc that was then annihilated in a military coup led by then General Suharto in 1965, to French Indochina, where Communist revolutionaries seized and consolidated power in two of the three emerging nation-states.

In conclusion, there are four ironies worth noting. First, the Chinese revolution, though certainly a real event of great international significance, was initially quite elastic and emerged as a “constructed” concept. Before it succeeded, that is, before Liberation, it consisted of three aspects: First, the recruitment of a committed constituency; second, the conduct of diplomacy and negotiations with adversaries and potential allies (as in Xian in 1936, forming the second United Front, or in Chongqing in 1945); and third, the waging of armed war. There were three major wars: the first in the urban insurrections of 1927-1931, the second in the defense of the Jiangxi Soviet in 1931-1934, and the third in the civil war of 1946-1949. Using different tactics in each, the CCP lost the first two but survived and won the third, which proved decisive. Certainly revolutionary appeals were, *inter alia*, useful in recruiting soldiers to serve in the Red Army. But what was determinative in the three wars was shrewd military strategy. In the post-Liberation reconstruction of the revolutionary experience, and particularly in the attempt to reprise it in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the military strategic aspect of the revolution receded from view, as did the compromising United Front dimension. The violent cleavage between rulers and ruled and violent an-

ti-authoritarian animus now took pride of place. This dramatized reconceptualization of the revolution tended to polarize relations with non-revolutionary groups, which often did not prove prudent given the balance of domestic and international forces among China's neighbors.

Second, the symbolic importance of the Chinese revolution in claiming world-wide leadership for the CCP was in retrospect more successful domestically than abroad. Within China, this claim does seem to have reinforced the Party's claims to a vanguard role by appealing to the preconceived notion of China as Asia's central and natural leader, and within the Party it facilitated the rise of Mao Zedong as the principal author of an innovative revolutionary strategy in opposition to his more ideologically well-versed "returned student" inner-Party opponents whose claim to power was based on faithful adherence to the Comintern line. Abroad, the use of the revolution as a justification for CCP leadership of revolution throughout the "colonial and semi-colonial, feudal and semi-feudal" new nations of the world could boast only two clear success stories, in North Korea and Vietnam. And even in these cases, as we have seen, the impact of the Chinese experience was limited, and has not resulted in reliable ties of loyalty with either country. Yet despite this less than stellar record abroad, China's identification with the international proliferation of the Chinese revolutionary "model," considerably magnified as it was in domestic propaganda, functioned as "collateral legitimation" for the CCP regime at home.¹⁴⁾

Third, it would seem that the Chinese revolutionary experience had greater foreign policy impact in the pre-Liberation period than during the more focused and muscular attempt to spread a revolutionary "prairie fire" in the post-Liberation era. For in the pre-1949 period the CCP achieved the only enduring revolutionary transference (to North Korea and French Indo-China) that it was to achieve throughout its revolutionary career. In the post-Liberation period China can point to many efforts but no such successfully completed revolutionary success stories. This is somewhat surprising, because the post-Liberation effort to spread revolution was both

14) This was particularly true after Liberation, when Beijing celebrated the visit of every leftist leader not only in the State-controlled media but with parades and other such choreographed fanfare.

more focused and pursued with far more resources behind it, including advisors, relatively munificent foreign aid (given China's still modest GDP), and weaponry. No doubt part of the reason for the modest rate of success was the onset of the Cold War and the mobilization of anti-communist efforts by the West and particularly by the US, which was not always successful but nearly always energetic and resourceful in opposing revolutionary advances. Yet the hardening or rhetorical dramatization of the Chinese revolutionary model, albeit highly effective as a propaganda vehicle, also contributed to that polarization.

Fourth, to the extent that the Chinese revolutionary experience influenced the rest of the world, it seems to have influenced the great powers more than the colonial and semi-colonial areas intended as its prime target audience. That is, it influenced the US, still reeling from a "loss" of China that shifted the power balance to Communist control of the bulk of the Eurasian land mass, to mount a massive (in retrospect excessive) internationally coordinated reaction to the incipient Communist "threat" that would polarize the world for the next half century. In the USSR, it excited anxiety over China's use of revolutionary innovations to usurp ideological leadership of the world revolution, contributing to the Sino-Soviet split. In Japan, it interrupted the reconciliation with that nation's militarist past and triggered a "reverse course," including the Japanese-American Security Alliance which would comprise a lasting impediment to China's future maritime ambitions. In the Third World, as noted, it achieved gains only in North Korea and French Indo-China, and neither proved to China's lasting advantage. True, one can argue that the failure of Mao's vision of the world "countryside" surrounding the world "cities" in an international recapitulation of People's War owed partly to China's own abandonment of these efforts. But I think it more accurate to say that China abandoned these movements because they had failed than to say that China's abandonment caused their failure.

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